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ESSAY 
A COMMON LAW OF CHOICE OF LAW 
Lea Brilmayer* & Daniel B. Listwa** 
 
For more than a generation, choice of law has been the victim of a 
historical contingency.  The “conflicts revolution” of the mid-twentieth 
century and its legal realist leaders bundled together three concepts that, 
although all typifying the traditional approach, are not inherently connected:  
the “scientific formalism” of Bealean territorialism, attention to “system 
values” like uniformity and predictability, and judicial activism.  The 
revolutionaries tied an anchor to formalism, sinking the regard for system 
values and judge-led decision-making in the process.  This Essay argues that 
the rejection of system values and judicial lawmaking in the choice-of-law 
context was a mistake—and it offers a means of reintegrating them into 
postrevolution choice-of-law thought. 
Waving the flag of “legislative supremacy,” modern choice-of-law theory 
has asserted that standard techniques of statutory interpretation ought to be 
determinative of how courts resolve choice-of-law problems.  However, the 
modernists have failed to grapple with what “interpretation” means in a 
context that is almost never contemplated by legislatures.  In recent years, 
those studying statutory interpretation have become increasingly 
sophisticated in their understandings of the ways in which courts use 
expansive sets of resources to counter difficult cases, leading to recognition 
of the “common law” of interpretation.  But, so far, choice-of-law theorists 
have been left behind—continuing to adhere to a primitive conception of 
statutory interpretation that shuns the role of the judge and the importance 
of broader goals, including the facilitation of system values.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, currently being circulated in draft 
form, continues that error, wholeheartedly endorsing an outdated and 
unworkable mode of interest analysis. 
This Essay offers a means of modernizing the modernists and rescuing the 
Restatement (Third) in the process.  The key insight is to recognize that 
judicial creativity and attention to the facilitation of a workable system of 
choice of law is fully consistent with realism.  Moreover, the principle of 
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legislative supremacy is better protected by a methodology that does not 
mask metaphysical invention behind empty phrases like “interests” but 
instead recognizes explicitly the important yet limited role of the judiciary.  
In line with these recommendations, this Essay advocates for the embrace of 
a “common law of choice of law” methodology, an approach that recognizes 
judicial, common-law rulemaking and that does not rely on sharp, fictive 
lines drawn between “interpreting” the law and developing system-oriented 
rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It was an academic bloodbath.  Emboldened by the successes of like-
minded reformists in other areas of the law, a generation of choice-of-law 
firebrands rose up against their elders in what is now known as “the choice-
of-law revolution.”  The old ways of thought were replaced by a new 
manifesto that, had it ever been written, would have read as follows: 
Our predecessors thought that they could determine the applicable law 
through introspection into first principles of territorial sovereignty.  Their 
view was that choice of law should serve the interstate system and that 
adherence to “system values” would promote predictability, prevent forum 
shopping, and protect parties’ vested rights.  To the brainchild of Harvard 
Law School Professor Joseph Beale, this theory of “vested rights” reflected 
an archaic jurisprudence, which has now been shown by legal realism to 
have no basis in fact or logic. 
This approach was a disaster.  The theory that the courts were trying to 
apply was so unconvincing that it was soon riddled with exceptions and 
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became a virtual laughingstock.  What is worse, their pursuit of the 
chimeras of “territorial sovereignty” and “vested rights” utterly 
neglected—in fact, undermined—a court’s proper function in a democracy:  
interpreting and applying the commands of its legislature.  The goal of the 
choice-of-law process, properly understood, is to implement one’s own 
state’s interests, as defined by the policies underlying the substantive 
statutes vying for application.1 
This theoretical manifesto was accompanied by more practical instructions 
about how choice-of-law decisions were supposed to be made.  Interests were 
to be determined by the usual domestic processes of interpreting the statutes 
implicated in a particular case.  In actuality, this reduced to the homily that 
states were interested in applying their laws where doing so would inure to 
the benefit of a local resident.  The theory became known as “governmental 
interest analysis,” reflecting the foundational principle that the “true” goal of 
choice of law was implementation of a state’s governmental interests. 
Fast forward five or six decades.  Interest analysis has now achieved 
dominance among the law reviews and is one of the theories embraced in our 
nation’s courts.  Its practical influence stems in part from the number of states 
that have adopted the theory in its entirety and in part from the influence that 
it has had on the development of other academic theories.  It has even 
captured the favor of an American Law Institute drafting committee, 
presently charged with producing a Restatement (Third) of Conflict of 
Laws.2  Indeed, the current draft of the Restatement (Third) wholeheartedly 
embraces interest analysis as the definitive account of what choice of law 
entails. 
Calling what happened during the choice-of-law revolution a bloodbath 
may be a bit melodramatic.  But it is not unfair; even some of the theory’s 
sympathizers were driven to violent metaphors.3  The old learning has never 
regained its former respectability.  And yet more recently, a 
counterrevolution has been emerging on the horizon; the modern theory faces 
attacks arguably comparable to those that brought it to power—the 
accusation that the modernists, like the territorialists before them, rely on a 
biased and metaphysical conception of states’ “interests” with little basis in 
reality.4 
 
 1. See infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text (discussing interest analysis and citing 
appropriate authorities). 
 2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF L. ch. 7, introductory cmt. (AM. L. INST., 
Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2017). 
 3. In the words of one scholar, the realists, led by Walter Wheeler Cook, “brutally 
murdered” Beale’s theory. Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: 
Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 
1087–88 (1956).  The description perhaps reflects the viciously personal way that Beale’s 
contemporaries mocked him and his theories. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 
1927–1960, at 25–28 (Edward White ed., 1986). 
 4. Although these debates are currently playing out in connection to the drafting of the 
Restatement (Third), criticisms of interest analysis have appeared in law reviews for decades. 
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 
392 (1980). 
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Some of the criticisms of interest analysis and its modern “metaphysics” 
are now taken quite seriously.5  But there is another problem, a more 
fundamental one, if anything, which has hardly been raised and never really 
addressed in this growing literature—focused as it is on deconstructing 
modern theorists’ ontological claims regarding the existence of state 
“interests.”  It concerns the peculiar role assigned to courts by modern 
choice-of-law theory. 
Modern choice-of-law theory claims to be grounded in the principle of 
legislative supremacy.6  Judges, it is said, have a duty to implement statutes.  
A court applying the traditional learning—grounded in facilitating 
interjurisdictional coordination—supposedly flouts legislative wishes 
because it does not claim to base its decisions on statutory construction.  
From this axiom, two key principles follow:  (1) choice of law should further 
states’ substantive policies; and (2) judges should have no leeway to decide 
the choice-of-law issue according to values germane to the interstate context, 
such as predictability, interstate harmony, or avoidance of forum shopping, 
because these objectives interfere with the pursuit of substantive policies that 
is a judge’s only legitimate goal. 
These guiding principles of modern choice-of-law theory, obviously, are 
closely tied to a particular conception of the judicial role.  The reason that 
courts should further state interests, the modernists assert, is that in a 
democracy, courts should be subservient to legislative wishes.7  A court (the 
modernists claim) can always find an answer to the question of the interstate 
scope of a statute if it looks at the statute itself.  And that is what it should 
do.  Judges are not supposed to exercise decision-making discretion but 
instead to implement the objectives of the legislature.  These axioms—the 
modernists urge us to believe—follow simply from the principle of 
legislative supremacy. 
But look again at the assumptions underlying this last set of claims.  First, 
these claims assume that all substantive law is statutory; this is obviously 
false.  Courts are sometimes faced with disputes in which both the cause of 
 
 5. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 
1283 (1989); Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law:  How It Ought Not to Be, 48 MERCER L. 
REV. 757, 760–61 (1997); Harold G. Maier, Finding the Trees in Spite of the Metaphorist:  
The Problem of State Interests in Choice of Law, 56 ALB. L. REV. 753, 753 (1993); Bruce 
Posnak, Choice of Law:  Interest Analysis and Its “New Crits,” 36 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 681, 
684–89 (1988). 
 6. See Courtland H. Peterson, Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth 
Century:  Progress or Regress, 46 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 197, 218 (1998). 
 7. Currie argued this point in terms manifesting his skepticism of courts and desire to 
minimize their role in the choice-of-law context, stating that the “choice between the 
competing interests of coordinate states is a political function of a high order, which ought 
not, in a democracy, to be committed to the judiciary.” Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and 
the Choice of Law:  Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 
77 (1958); see also Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 
1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176 [hereinafter Currie, Notes on Methods] (“[A]ssessment of the 
respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to 
determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order.  This is a function 
which should not be committed to courts in a democracy.”). 
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action and the defenses are all based on common law.  Statutory construction 
cannot resolve questions of application in such cases.8  Second, the claims 
assume that where a statute is involved, there will always be a right answer 
to the question of the law’s scope; this is doubtful and no support is offered 
for it.  Third, they assume that legislatures do not want courts to take account 
of systemic or procedural values because it is only substantive policies that 
count.  There is no foundation for this assumption, and it is implausible as an 
empirical matter.  Finally, these principles are said to be grounded in the 
ordinary domestic methodology that courts apply in cases with no multistate 
dimensions.  The modern theorists argue that they are doing nothing more 
than extending to the interstate system the methodological principles that 
already govern domestic decision-making.  This claim does not pass the 
straight-face test. 
If one puts these modernist principles all together, one comes to the overall 
conclusion that judges should never play a creative role in the development 
of the rules of choice of law—just as they supposedly do not when enforcing 
domestic, substantive law.  All that judges should ever do—either 
domestically or in interstate disputes—is interpret statutes.  But how can this 
be the methodological foundation for a modern theory of choice of law?  The 
firebrands responsible for starting the assault on traditional choice of law 
claimed to be adherents of legal realism—but does this sound like legal 
realism?  Does it sound like any sophisticated theory of how domestic courts 
decide either statutory or common-law cases? 
The modern choice-of-law theorists’ misunderstanding of the common-
law method is matched only by their misunderstanding of principles of 
statutory construction.  There are substantial bodies of literature on both the 
common law and statutory interpretation, but neither has been brought to bear 
by modernist proponents of the statutory method.  As a result, modern choice 
of law has failed to reckon with one of the most important and challenging 
issues in statutory interpretation:  when are there gaps in a statute and how, 
when a gap exists, is a judge to go about filling it?  Instead, the modern 
theorists ignore this issue and base their model on an account of the relative 
roles of the courts and legislatures in choice of law that defies reality—all the 
while deriding those who disagree with them as adherents of an outdated and 
undemocratic set of theories. 
At stake in this debate are some of the most basic foundational principles 
of the American legal system.  Today, we find ourselves at a potential 
inflection point; the future of choice of law is up for grabs.  The new 
restatement that is currently on the drafting table would take positions on 
many of the questions outlined above.  With multistate disputes an 
unavoidable feature of modern life, choice of law is more important than 
ever.  There could not be a more auspicious point in time to sort out the merits 
of the competing approaches to choice of law.  This Essay tells the story of 
how the issue of judicial role was treated when it first arose, the extent to 
 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
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which the criticisms of the traditional understandings of that role were 
justified, the defects in the modern theory that replaced it, and what should 
be done about the problem now. 
A simple historical account of how we got to where we are would be 
fascinating enough.  It would be a story of personal enmity, intellectual 
ambition, and real-world pathos involving tens of thousands of litigants 
whose financial futures depend on which state’s law will govern their cases.9  
But the history of the subject barely scratches the surface of the issues’ 
significance to legal theory and legal practice.  For purposes of this Essay, 
history is largely of instrumental interest; the main focus here is to learn from 
past mistakes to avoid repeating them or making new ones. 
To begin, we present our diagnosis of the problem.  Part I explains how it 
was that judicial lawmaking regarding conflict of laws came to be 
irreversibly associated with system values and how both were simultaneously 
banished from polite company in contemporary choice-of-law circles.  As we 
explain, the banishment of judicially enforced system values largely is due 
to a matter of historical contingency.  Beale’s territorial theory was rightfully 
criticized for its formalism and reliance on an outdated conception of state 
sovereignty.  But in ferociously tearing down Beale’s hegemony, the 
modernists also attacked all that was associated with it, including recognition 
of the importance of judges in facilitating an efficient system of choice of 
law.  Bearing the standard of “legislative supremacy,” the conflicts 
revolution forced judicial creativity and system values into the shadows, 
despite their necessary and important roles in choice of law. 
Part II critiques the solution that has been adopted by the modern theories.  
The conflicts revolution replaced the territorial model with interest 
analysis—a theory that suggests that every choice-of-law dispute can be 
resolved by turning to the “usual processes” of domestic statutory 
construction and interpretation.  Although the modernists never quite define 
what this means, the general suggestion is that the answers to all questions 
can be inferred from the intentions of the legislatures that enacted the 
implicated laws.  As we explain, this appeal to the usual processes fails on 
two counts.  First, it is simply not the case that statutory interpretation can 
never leave space for judicial creativity.  In hard cases, the statute is open-
textured; it falls on the courts to utilize their discretion to make choices about 
how the law should be applied.  Second, it is simply not true that the usual 
processes of statutory interpretation in the domestic context eschew 
considerations beyond the substantive policies underlying the statutes 
themselves, which is what the modernists assume.  Instead, courts engaged 
in statutory interpretation regularly look beyond the specific statutes in 
question to consider broader policy goals.  The usual processes of statutory 
interpretation do indeed allow for judges to consider system values when 
constructing their interpretations. 
 
 9. See infra notes 21–27 and accompanying text. 
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Part III offers an alternative to interest analysis and its dogmatic invocation 
of statutory interpretation:  the solution that it presents is a common-law 
method of choice of law.  As this part explains, common-law reasoning is, in 
many situations, a better way to conceive of the choice-of-law process than 
either the modern approach that dominates choice-of-law theory today or the 
traditional approach that it replaced.  Focusing on the promise of the 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, we show how the common-law 
conception of the judge’s role in choice of law provides a better justification 
for the promulgation of a new restatement than the modernist theories do—
despite the fact that the current draft explicitly endorses interest analysis.  
Interest analysis—which grounds the resolution of each choice-of-law 
dispute in an individual act of statutory interpretation—cannot explain the 
value of a single set of nationally distributed choice-of-law rules.  On the 
other hand, within the common law of choice of law framework, the 
Restatement (Third) can be understood as an important coordination device, 
a focal point around which judges can harmonize their decisions, so as to 
facilitate a more uniform and predictable interjurisdictional system of choice 
of law.  Such a result is only possible when the important role of courts in 
determining the applicable law is recognized.  And such recognition is only 
possible if contemporary theorists recognize the importance of the common 
law of choice of law. 
I.  JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND THE CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION 
Choice-of-law disputes are frustrating in the extreme; they involve 
juggling multiple, potentially contradictory bodies of law, while 
simultaneously balancing competing values, such as respect for 
cosovereigns, reduction of forum shopping, and promotion of substantive 
policies.  Hardly anyone who deals with multistate legal problems on a 
regular basis welcomes close contact with a choice-of-law problem.  But 
welcome or not, the task of selecting the applicable law is an integral part of 
analyzing, litigating, and adjudicating cases in a world where people interact 
across state and international boundaries. 
This has never been a problem for our legislatures—with some minor 
exceptions, choice of law in the United States has never been a subject ruled 
by statutes.10  Legislatures take up issues that they deem politically rewarding 
or practically compelling; choice of law has rarely looked so rewarding or 
compelling that our legislators choose to get involved.  The subject, 
inevitably, is left to the courts to figure out.  Courts cannot simply pass the 
 
 10. While a couple of states have enacted general codifications of specific choice-of-law 
rules, the vast majority have merely said nothing at all about the general approach to be taken 
in resolving choice-of-law disputes—effectively leaving the issue to the courts. See James A. 
R. Nafziger, The Louisiana and Oregon Codifications of Choice-of-Law Rules in Context, 58 
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 165, 169 (2010).  That said, many states have adopted specific, rule-like 
choice-of-law provisions in at least a few specific areas of law.  New York, for example, 
famously enacted legislation allowing parties around the world to elect for New York law to 
govern their contracts. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2020). 
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questions that they find too hard or too politically disagreeable to the next in 
line, as legislatures do.  For courts, there is no next in line. 
The “dismal swamp” of multistate relations has therefore traditionally 
fallen to courts to drain.11  Until the second half of the twentieth century, 
choice of law was part and parcel of the American common law;12 hardly 
anyone complained about the fact that choice of law was the responsibility 
of our courts and not our legislatures.  In carrying out this assignment, the 
courts relied on case law, academic treatises, and once it was published, the 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.  This was effectively the same 
collection of sources that courts consulted on any other topic in the common 
law.  There the matter rested, until around the middle of the twentieth 
century. 
Then the academic winds abruptly shifted.  The authority of courts over 
choice of law was newly recast as judges riding roughshod over democratic 
prerogatives, rather than as judges being stuck with jobs that no one else had 
wanted.  The source of the complaint was legal realism; its academic 
adherents felt that choice of law should be radically rewritten.13  Choice of 
law was henceforth to be a purely statutory subject.  This line of criticism 
was somewhat ironic considering that legal realism, generally speaking, was 
quite accommodating to the fact that courts made law and did not find it.  
Besides, the country’s legislatures and executives seemed more grateful than 
offended by the supposed judicial usurpation. 
The long debate between “traditional” theories and “contemporary” 
theories that followed pitted traditional virtues—the needs of the interstate 
system—against the substantive policy interests of individual states.  
Traditional theories focused only on system values and excluded substantive 
policies; contemporary theories, conversely, focus on substantive policies to 
the exclusion of system values.14  Caught up in this debate is the subject of 
interest here:  the division of authority between courts and legislatures.  
Restatement (First) learning expected judges to operate as the protectors of 
the interstate system and the guardians of system values, while contemporary 
learning expects judges to adopt a posture more reflective of legislative 
policy priorities.  This competition for influence has dominated much of the 
 
 11. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
 12. See RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON 
LAW:  THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 61–97 
(1977); Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws:  A Challenge, 35 
MERCER L. REV. 555, 561–63 (1984); David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process 
and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 737–43 (1963); Max Rheinstein, 
The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 805 (1955); Mark D. Rosen, 
Choice-of-Law as Non-constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2015). 
 13. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2448, 2458–60 (1999). 
 14. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Certainty vs. Flexibility in the Conflict of Laws, in THE 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND CONTINUING RELEVANCE 
6, 7 (Franco Ferrari & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2019) (“[T]he First Restatement is 
inflexible, territorial, traditional, and rule-based, while the Second Restatement is flexible, 
policy-based, modern, and standard-like.”). 
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literature on choice of law since the choice-of-law revolution first broke out.  
But as we shall see below, other issues that have seen relatively little attention 
are in fact more fundamental. 
A.  System Values:  The Traditionalist Position 
Choice of law in the American federal system was always, by tradition, a 
common-law subject, subject to very little statutory development.  As the 
standard telling goes, the courts largely followed an approach typified by the 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, whose rules were informed by the 
goal of supporting the well-being of the multistate system.15  Modern choice-
of-law theory arose out of a reform movement in the mid-twentieth century, 
during which the conceptual framework of the Restatement (First) was 
largely unseated and replaced.  The phenomenon at issue here—the 
contemporary choice-of-law theorist’s dismissive stance toward the 
common-law functions of judges—was a product of this reform movement.  
Evaluation of this so-called “choice-of-law revolution” must therefore start 
with the Restatement (First). 
The drafting of the Restatement (First) began nearly a century ago.  At that 
time, American aspirations for the choice-of-law process were fairly 
unassuming.  Choice-of law rules, it was thought, were designed to promote 
what we refer to here as “system values”—so named because they concerned 
the protection of the international/interstate system.  These values included 
uniformity, predictability, discouragement of forum shopping, interstate 
harmony, and the protection of party expectations.16 
These values are closely related to one another.  Consider how uniform 
treatment of choice of law provides predictability and, as a result, helps the 
parties to a litigation:  people rarely plan on getting entangled in litigation, 
and when they do, they frequently do not know where that litigation will take 
place until it begins.  As a result, if states take different approaches to choice 
of law, parties cannot be sure what law governs their conduct.  This creates 
costly uncertainty, potentially undermining interstate activity.  In contrast, 
clear, predictable, and uniform choice-of-law rules benefit both people and 
states, lessening the concern that expectations will be frustrated by 
manipulation or error.  Appreciation for the importance of such system-
oriented rules goes back hundreds of years and is even reflected in the U.S. 
Constitution, whose Full Faith and Credit Clause17 explicitly delegates to 
 
 15. Although it is generally assumed that the Restatement (First) largely reflected 
historical approaches to choice of law, the truth is—as is often the case—more complicated. 
See generally Daniel B. Listwa & Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Problems, Comity Solution, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHOICE OF LAW (forthcoming 2021).  But for present 
purposes, we can assume that the Restatement (First) represents the “traditional” approach. 
 16. See Ernest G. Lorenzen & Raymond J. Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of 
Laws, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 556 (1935). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
898 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Congress the authority to craft a federal system of choice of law, an authority 
that—perhaps disappointingly—has never been invoked.18 
In his seminal treatise, published towards the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Harvard’s Professor Joseph Beale (the Restatement (First)’s reporter 
and a committed formalist) built an entire theory around values such as these, 
referred to as the “vested rights” theory.  Beale offered a detailed set of rules 
built on the territorial premise that a state’s law was supreme within its own 
jurisdiction but powerless beyond those borders.19  But critically, Beale did 
not justify his set of rules on the grounds of the mutual convenience that 
would be wrought were all states to adopt them.  Rather, he argued that such 
a territorial conception of choice of law—and specifically, his articulation of 
that conception—was mandated by the very nature of state sovereignty.20  
For this reason, in Beale’s mind, his commitment to system values to the 
exclusion of substantive policy was justified by the deepest of legal 
arguments.  And thus, nearly a hundred years ago, system values and 
formalistic legal ontology became fatefully associated:  both were the 
province of the judiciary. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Beale’s rule-bound 
theory dominated conflicts of law in both the courts and classrooms.21  But 
the near monopoly that his theories once enjoyed at the start of that period 
became more tenuous as the decades wore on.  In the latter half of the last 
century, a reform movement grounded in legal realism mounted an attack on 
this distribution of responsibility.  It accused the courts of violating the 
principle of legislative supremacy by shirking their responsibility to further 
the legislature’s substantive policy choices.22  Thus was born the perennial 
debate between system and substance, with its implications for the division 
of authority between courts and legislatures. 
The critique got underway before Beale’s magnum opus, the Restatement 
(First), was even finished.  With unabashed ferocity, the rising school of legal 
realism—which Beale mistakenly dismissed as an “ephemeral school of legal 
philosophy”23—discredited the vested rights theory and the man behind it.  
In violent and colorful language, the realists thrust Beale’s theories out of 
polite company.24  The result was to bury Beale and all that is associated with 
him deep into the ground, a grave from which his legacy has yet to emerge.25 
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 20. Id. § 5.4, at 53. 
 21. Erwin N. Griswold, Mr. Beale and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARV. L. REV. 690, 690 
(1943). 
 22. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 182, 610, 617 
(1963). 
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B.  Substantive Policies and the Basic Modernist Claim 
The realist attacks on Beale were multipronged but importantly 
intertwined.  First and foremost, the realists criticized the jurisprudential 
framework that Beale relied on—a formalism that sought to derive from first 
principles a body of law, “without special reference to the actual law in any 
particular state.”26  Such a model of the law, Walter Wheeler Cook and the 
realists argued, relied on a mistaken notion that “rights” and other legal 
conceptions “exist” in some way that is abstracted from the actual behavior 
of the actors in the legal system.27  Beale was wrong—they said—to direct 
judges to apply choice-of-law rules derived from abstract metaphysics while 
ignoring the substantive applicability of the contending laws.28  Such a 
method of decision-making was not only jurisprudentially bankrupt, the 
realists argued, but also impractical.  Despite the false sheen of Beale’s logic, 
the rules were ultimately indeterminate in application and open to 
manipulation, undermining the very system values they supposedly upheld.29 
Although the realist contributions were largely critical in nature, their 
complaints led to a new way of thinking and talking about the choice-of-law 
problem, one that claimed the imprimatur of legal realist principles.  The 
main exponent of the positive theory that largely replaced Beale was Brainerd 
Currie.  Having in effect declared judicial involvement under the traditional 
common-law method persona non grata, Currie developed a new 
methodology based on statutes.30  In the place of judge-made choice of law, 
the common-law method, and multistate system values, Currie endorsed 
legislative supremacy, statutory interpretation, and substantive policies.31  
Most important of these for present purposes was the replacement of the 
common-law method with Currie’s theory of statutory construction, 
including his views on deference to the elected branches. 
Currie seized on the realist notion that choice of law was not some abstract 
set of concepts but rather a tool to be used to further state policy.32  He 
developed a new discourse around this conception of choice of law:  a state 
was said to have an “interest” in applying its statute if extending the 
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geographic reach of the state’s statute to the dispute in question would further 
the substantive policies underlying the statute.33  System values such as 
protection of party expectations and respect for sister states were out; 
substantive policies and pursuit of state interests were in. 
Currie’s advice to judges faced with choice-of-law disputes was to address 
choice-of-law problems by interpreting statutes; supposedly statutes 
provided all of the necessary information for choosing the applicable law.  
Whether a particular substantive statute applied to a particular multistate fact 
pattern was to be determined by using the familiar domestic law processes of 
“construction or interpretation” of the substantive rules vying for 
application.34  If the familiar processes of statutory construction resulted in a 
decision to which the statute applied, then the state was said to have an 
“interest.”35 
Currie expected his theory36 to work essentially as follows:  the single 
most important step is to determine which states, if any, have “interests” in 
the application of their laws to the dispute as the rule of decision.  A state has 
an interest if and only if the purpose of its law would be furthered by applying 
it to the case at hand.  This is to be determined by ascertaining the multistate 
scope of each of the contending statutes.  A state’s law applied by its own 
terms if, when properly interpreted, it encompassed the fact pattern of the 
case before the court.  By interpreting the statute, in other words, and 
applying that interpretation to the fact pattern at hand, one might determine 
whether a state has an “interest” in having its law applied.  Without an 
“interest,” a state lacks the prima facie claim to have its law applied. 
This analytical framework gives rise to three distinct categories of 
“conflicts,” which Currie labeled false conflicts, true conflicts, and 
“unprovided-for cases.”37  If only one state has an interest, then the case is a 
“false conflict.”38  In these cases, the law of the only interested state ought to 
be applied—this will effectuate the policy of the interested state, while 
leaving the policies of the other implicated state uninjured.  If both states are 
interested, then it is a true conflict—the choice of one state’s law over the 
other will necessarily leave the other state’s interests unvindicated.39  Taking 
true conflicts as unsolvable, Currie argued that the forum ought to apply its 
own law, regardless of the system-warping incentives such a policy would 
create.40  Finally, where no state is found to be interested (the “unprovided-
for case”), Currie again suggested applying the law of the forum, arguing that 
such a firm and uncompromising rule was better than giving the judge any 
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discretion to choose.41  The result is a system exactly opposite the uniformity 
of the traditional method:  except in the instance of a false conflict, the law 
that governs a particular dispute depends on the state in which the suit was 
ultimately brought—with each forum state applying its own law. 
The reformers, with Currie at the helm, justified their rejection of system 
values on the grounds that taking them into account interfered with the 
promotion of substantive policy.  If application of local law was called for in 
order to further some substantive policy, then allowing system values to 
override that substantive policy was illegitimate.  The reason was the 
principle of legislative supremacy—that is to say, judicial deference to the 
elected branches.42  Privileging system values over local statutory concerns 
was unacceptable judicial activism.  The pursuit of traditional choice-of-law 
values, such as decisional uniformity, multistate harmony, and the like, had 
to be abandoned because that was not a proper role for courts in a democratic 
society. 
As this short account of the subject’s intellectual history reflects, the 
conflicts revolution, as it is known, facilitated a bundling of three concepts:  
the “scientific formalism” of Bealean territorialism, a system-values 
approach to choice of law, and judicial activism.  All three of these 
conceptual positions were rejected simultaneously.  In their stead, interest 
analysts’ self-declared pragmatic, policy-oriented, and legislatively centered 
approach gained prominence.  Its appeal to the late twentieth-century legal 
mind should not be too surprising.  Framing its chief objective as the efficient 
promotion of legislatively declared policy, the overall effect was scientific, 
democratic, and no-nonsense.  Today, it is reported that interest analysis “is 
the leading scholarly position, and the only doctrine that could plausibly 
claim to have generated a school of adherents.”43  The extent to which it has 
come to dominate modern thinking on choice of law is suggested by the fact 
that interest analysis has finally—fifty years after its first introduction—been 
largely adopted by the new draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws.44 
C.  The Basic Modernist Claims Today 
An impressive intellectual edifice, interest analysis has provoked not only 
criticism but also the creation of a number of variations upon the theme.  In 
this section, we discuss the variants that have emerged—noting the ways in 
which they have evolved to meet certain criticisms of Currie’s original 
theory.  But for our purposes, it is what they share that is of greatest 
significance:  the notion that judicial attention to system values cannot be 
given pride of place without infringing on legislative supremacy.  This basic 
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commitment, inherited from Currie, remains a critical component of the 
modern theories. 
1.  Divergent Applications Within Interest Analysis 
The major cause of difference between the modernist subgroups probably 
results from divergent approaches to one particular thorny issue of 
application:  what to do if either a true conflict or unprovided-for case arises.  
Some authors balk at Currie’s instructions simply to apply forum law, 
acknowledging the mayhem that would be introduced by such an approach.45  
In place of this crude solution, various alternatives have been proposed.  
These include, for example, William Baxter’s “comparative impairment” 
approach, which directs courts to resolve choice-of-law questions so as to do 
the least violence to the interests of the states involved.46  Another is Robert 
Leflar’s five nonhierarchical “choice influencing considerations,” which 
include—most influentially—the determination of which of the conflicting 
states’ laws is the “better” one.47  The influence of these alternatives, which 
have been embraced by some states, have helped facilitate a greater 
appreciation of system values in the mainstream—but they have not brought 
about any deeper examination of the theoretical constructs underpinning 
interest analysis. 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is another modern theory—
at least in the sense that it emerged as a rejection of the Bealean framework.  
It has proven popular with courts, but conflicts scholars have condemned it 
as a “mush”48 with “no explanatory power”49 that offers little guidance to its 
users.50  The Restatement (Second) essentially provides judges with a list of 
considerations to be weighed in determining which state has the “most 
significant relationship” to the dispute in question.51  Notably, these 
considerations include the substantive policies of the forum and other 
interested states, as well as system values, such as certainty, predictability, 
and uniformity.52  In that sense, it has a foot in both the Restatement (First) 
and Currie’s interest analysis. 
The still tentative drafts of the Restatement (Third) endorse yet another 
version of interest analysis, though using a different terminology.  For 
instance, instead of saying that a state has an “interest” in the dispute at hand, 
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it is said that the dispute falls within the “scope” of the state’s law.53  Also 
notable is the way that the draft Restatement (Third) seeks to integrate the 
theoretical model associated with interest analysis with a decision framework 
governed by a set of rules combined with an escape clause.54  The focus 
placed on these rules represents a significant break with Currie, who argued 
that choice-of-law rules “cannot be made to work”55 and are, by their nature, 
“empty and bloodless thing[s].”56  As we have previously argued, the focus 
on rules—which are derived by looking at prevailing practices in the courts—
cannot be reconciled with Currie’s theoretical framework, as it substitutes 
deference to prevailing norms for individualized acts of statutory 
interpretation.57  This is a theme to which we return in the latter half of this 
Essay. 
More changes are probably in store for the future.  Leading adherents to 
interest analysis have shown that they are thinking deeply about the 
jurisprudential foundations of choice of law and are open to reconsidering 
long-held assumptions.58  In addition, certain spots of tension have developed 
among adherents on key issues for interest analysis, including what it means 
to say that a state has an “interest.”  Specifically, as the reporter of the 
Restatement (Third) has acknowledged, “there has been debate” among 
adherents of interest analysis as to whether “courts should be free to disregard 
the words of sister-state statutes and the interpretations of the courts of those 
states” in declaring whether a given state has an interest or not.59  Those who 
defend courts’ right to do so are said to understand interest to be objective, 
while those who oppose this view take interests to be subjective.60  While we 
can put aside these divisions for present purposes, it is worthwhile to note 
that they exist and thus to acknowledge that today “interest analysis” is not a 
monolith. 
2.  Premises Shared by Interest Analysis 
Despite the depth of disagreement between these theories, the common 
principles that they share still justify treating them as variations on a single 
theme.  We shall, accordingly, refer to all of these divergent strands as 
“modernist,” given that on the issues of importance here, the differences are 
not substantial.  The most important points do seem to be settled.  For present 
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purposes, two are particularly significant:  the sharp distinction between 
system values and substantive policies and the perception of incompatibility 
between an active judiciary and the principle of legislative supremacy. 
Deeply ingrained in the theoretical apparatus of modern choice of law is 
the notion that an embrace of system values necessarily involves a 
compromise of substantive values.61  For Currie, the rejection of system 
values was nearly total.  He argued that courts should resolve conflicts purely 
by looking at whether the states in question have an interest in the dispute as 
a matter of domestic, substantive policy and, if both do, simply choosing the 
law of the forum—wholly undermining any hope for uniformity or 
predictability in the process.62 
In all the modernist variants, therefore, consideration of system factors is 
minimized and their function is sharply distinguished from that of substantive 
values.  Even in the writings of the academics that have diverged from 
Currie’s version of the modern theory, they are relevant, if at all, only as 
tiebreakers.  The scope of a particular state’s law is still to be resolved wholly 
by reference to domestic, substantive policies and by use of the methodology 
of statutory interpretation.63  To do anything else, it is presumed, would be 
to sacrifice fidelity to legislative supremacy in the name of Bealean system 
values.  The modernist theory’s exclusive focus on substantive values, and 
its concomitant rejection of system values, has been the hallmark of the 
postrevolution approach to choice of law—what could be called the “modern 
choice-of-law orthodoxy.” 
The second theme that has remained constant throughout the development 
of modern choice of law is the modern theorists’ mistrust of common-law 
lawmaking.  The villain of the traditional territorialist account of choice of 
law was a judicial system—dominated by unprincipled “local” judges—that 
had disregarded the purpose for which domestic courts were constituted64: 
the provision of individual justice in keeping with the furtherance of 
authoritatively developed substantive policies.  The error that had been made 
(in the eyes of the modern theorists) was the substitution of system values for 
substantive policies.65  But what made the error possible was the fact that the 
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democratically unresponsive judges had stepped in and taken over a function 
that was not properly theirs. 
Neither the reformers who sought an approach based on interests nor the 
old-fashioned choice-of-law theorists who fought for retention of the 
Restatement (First)’s methodology devoted much of their time to debating 
the merits of the principle of legislative supremacy in the conflict of laws.  
Each side of the debate apparently took its position as self-evident.66  The 
choice-of-law revolution was recognized as implicating ideas about the 
proper role of judges; but neither the formalists nor the modernists ever 
developed a sustained and coherent theory of judicial function. 
II.  JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND THE MODERN APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 
Part I of this Essay identified three jurisprudential assumptions that 
underlie the modern choice-of-law approach:  the rejection of formalism, the 
rejection of system values, and the rejection of a creative role for the 
judiciary.  These were linked together largely as a matter of historical 
contingency; although it happened in the choice-of-law context in the first 
half of the twentieth century that the judiciary supported system values, and 
adopted a heavily formalistic approach, the courts could very well have taken 
the opposite position.67  Although the modernists tie their rejection of system 
values and formalism to their complaints about the judiciary, they give no 
reason to assume that the judiciary was either necessarily more formalistic or 
a stronger supporter of the interstate system than other branches of 
government.  The revolutionaries’ main complaint was against formalism 
and system values, yet they included the judiciary within their general sense 
of grievance toward all things traditional. 
The courts did make a tempting target.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
complaining about undemocratic decision-making by courts was a growth 
industry.  In 1961, Alexander Bickel had just published his oft celebrated—
and almost as frequently vilified—article on passive virtues and was about to 
publish The Least Dangerous Branch.68  The book was published in 1963, 
the year that also saw the publication of Currie’s Selected Essays on the 
Conflict of Laws, the foundational text for adherents of interest analysis.69  
Skepticism of judicial activists was in the air—and the field of conflict of 
laws would not be excepted in feeling its effects.70 
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Although at most contingently linked to the rejection of formalism and 
system values, legislative supremacy supplied those modernist premises with 
normative cover.  A highly theoretical challenge to the foundational basis of 
the obscure legal specialty of choice of law could not be expected to excite 
much moral outrage even on law faculties, let alone in the general population.  
But reframing the complaint in terms of the role of the courts in a 
democracy—at the end of the ten-year period in which the Warren Court 
gave us Brown v. Board of Education,71 Baker v. Carr,72 and Mapp v. 
Ohio73—tied the choice-of-law problem to pressing current events.  The 
temptation to hitch one’s wagon to the ideas that Bickel popularized and to 
capitalize on the general sense of malaise inflicting many observers of the 
American judicial system was undeniably present.  Bealean theory was 
therefore declared illegitimate because it was countermajoritarian.  Maybe it 
was not quite as powerful as a complaint about the Warren Court’s 
constitutional rights activism, but it was probably better than nothing. 
Few—if any—traditionalists saw fit to engage on the legislative 
supremacy argument; either they did not see a response or they did not think 
one necessary.  Whatever the strategic value of the slogan to the choice-of-
law revolutionaries, however, legislative supremacy is in point of fact 
completely inadequate as a weapon to use against Bealean choice-of-law 
theory.  Legislative supremacy is irrelevant where the legislature has no 
position on the matter under examination.  Why would legislative power be 
threatened by judges resolving issues that no legislature has even bothered to 
decide?  It was not as though judges were eagerly overreaching into areas 
where they had no business.  Judges were charged with deciding cases, and 
this included selecting the applicable law, whether they liked it or not.74 
Moreover, there is no reason to assume that any other theory of choice of 
law would produce results more in line with democratic legitimacy.  If one 
assumes modern theory honors legislative preferences but traditional theory 
does not, then perhaps we should indeed be worried about Bealean judges 
rampaging around like bulls in a china shop.  But there is no reason to make 
such an assumption.  The modernists apparently thought it was obvious that 
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their approach was superior from the point of view of democratic theory.75  
The closest that modern theorists ever came to justifying their attempt to 
claim the democratic moral high ground, however, was their premise that 
interests are determined by construing statutes.76  The legislative supremacy 
argument ultimately reduces, therefore, to the claim that the determination of 
governmental interests is a product of “the typical method of interpretation 
used to determine the scope of a law in purely domestic cases.”77  As the next 
section will demonstrate, the evidence on this claim all points in the opposite 
direction—a serious look at how courts approach interpretive questions 
uncontemplated by the legislature reveals the creativity demanded of judges 
in such circumstances. 
We are not by any means antagonistic to the principle of legislative 
supremacy.  Where courts and legislatures disagree, the legislative will 
should govern unless some constitutional provision or governing federal law 
provides otherwise.  We simply disagree about what this means.  This Essay 
argues that the principle of legislative supremacy does not rule out the 
exercise of judicial decision-making power.  To the contrary, our legislatures 
count on courts as something of a junior partner in the exercise of making 
policy.  It is expected that they will play a substantial, although subsidiary, 
role by fleshing out statutory language and resolving issues the legislature 
has not answered. 
A.  The Limited Relevance of Legislative Supremacy 
Modern choice-of-law theory’s basic argument depends on being able to 
show that the exercise of judicial creativity to reach choice-of-law decisions 
violates the principle of legislative supremacy.  But if these decisions are left 
to the judiciary by a legislature that simply declines to deal with issues of this 
sort, then legislative supremacy is not violated.  If the legislature is genuinely 
silent, then there is no countermajoritarian objection to the judge arriving at 
a choice-of-law decision.  And unless there is some reason to think that the 
legislature objects to system values, there is no basis for prohibiting judges 
from taking them into account.  Traditionalists agree that there is no dispute 
over the superiority of legislative wishes in nonconstitutional questions that 
the legislature has actually decided.  They would claim, however, that if the 
legislature has not decided the problem, this leaves a gap that the courts must 
fill.78 
Treating legislative silence as an invitation to the courts to decide the 
choice-of-law issue themselves poses a real threat to governmental interest 
analysis.  To the traditionalist-minded judge, it amounts to an invitation to 
take system values into account, to promote the vindication of vested rights—
in short, to do everything that the modern theorists believed courts should 
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avoid.  The possibility that statutory construction might not produce an 
answer is therefore a serious challenge to the modernists.  Everything 
depends, in other words, on whether there is a legislative position on the issue 
that the judge is facing—a hook on which legislative supremacy can hang its 
hat. 
It is generally agreed that legislatures rarely state the interstate reach of 
legislation in so many words.79  But the modern theory takes the position that 
the absence of any explicit indication of legislative consideration of the issue 
is not fatal, because a legislative position can be inferred from the text of the 
statute and the statute’s underlying policy—essentially positing that for each 
substantive policy there is an interstate scope that would best forward that 
policy.  Thus, by consulting the policy underlying that statute, an answer can 
always be found.  The methodology that it claims to apply in accomplishing 
this derivation is said to be the usual processes of statutory construction and 
interpretation.80  The results of applying this methodology to determine the 
interstate reach of statutes, it is argued, are as authoritative as the results of 
applying this methodology to determine the reach of statutes in domestic 
cases. 
The “new critics” of the modern methodology disagree.  They find 
implausible the claim that choice-of-law consequences can be drawn from 
apparently silent statutes “like rabbits from a hat.”81  The rabbits, the new 
critics claim, are not the result of any genuine statutory construction 
methodology but simply the imputation of the modernists’ own value 
judgments to the legislature in situations where no evidence of actual intent 
can be found.82  In support of this claim, the new critics point out that the 
modernists refuse to accept indications of actual legislative intent when they 
point toward a territorialist result.83  The modernists, the new critics point 
out, are more interested in getting results consistent with interest analysis 
than in showing respect to the democratically elected legislature. 
 
 79. Elliott E. Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 430, 448 
(1941) (“The statutes of a state, like the common-law rules of a state, are for the most part 
formulated without regard to Conflict of Laws.  The ordinary statutes and the ordinary 
common-law rules of a state are normally referred to and applied, however, in a Conflict of 
Laws case.”); id. at 449–50 (“Most statutes are formulated with regard to only the ordinary or 
internal situations and on the problems of Conflict of Laws they are silent.”). 
 80. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 81. Brilmayer, supra note 4, at 402. 
 82. Id.; see also Maurice Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 946, 957 (1981) (arguing that interest analysis “requires imposing externally derived 
value judgments on” the laws of the implicated states). 
 83. One manner in which this is manifested is through the “objective” view of choice-of-
law policies endorsed by many interest analysts.  An interest analyst who takes an objective 
approach makes a determination regarding the relevant interests at stake “de novo, without 
crediting any prior determination by the state.” Brilmayer & Seidell, supra note 60, at 2075.  
In making this determination, they tend to set aside territoriality and other system values in an 
effort to narrow the set of relevant considerations.  By narrowing the view of what each state 
may consider at stake, one has a greater chance of finding that the dispute in question presents 
a false conflict. Id. at 2075–76. 
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The only basis that modern theory has provided for assuming that a right 
answer can always be found in the interstate context is to point to the fact 
that when faced with the need to decide issues on which the legislature has 
not spoken in the domestic context, it somehow finds a way to do so.  This 
has been the stock response since the early days of interest analysis, and it 
continues to be the stock response today.84  It surely cannot be impossible 
for courts to find sufficient guidance in the statute, the argument runs, 
because that is what they do every day in ordinary domestic cases. 
But a fallacy lies beneath this argument.  The claim is that the ability of 
courts to decide cases on a silent statutory record demonstrates the feasibility 
of the method that Brainerd Currie recommended.  This is only the case if 
the method that courts use to decide cases on a silent statutory record in the 
domestic context is the same method that Currie recommended to resolve 
choice-of-law disputes.  If the two methods are different, then the fact that 
courts are successful at resolving domestic cases proves exactly nothing 
about the feasibility of interest analysis.  The entire argument thus stands or 
falls on the claim that the modern theorists make about “the usual processes 
of statutory construction and interpretation.”85  To put it another way—the 
most pressing question facing the future of choice of law in the United States 
is whether or not interest analysis is consistent with a conception of statutory 
interpretation that accurately reflects the methodologies utilized by judges to 
resolve noninterstate disputes. 
And, in our view, that answer is clear.  The differences between the two 
methods—statutory construction in domestic cases and interest analysis 
“construction” in choice-of-law cases—are obvious and undeniable.  All it 
takes is a comparison between the sources consulted in the domestic context 
and the sources listed in the literature of interest analysis.  When interest 
analysis is explained by its proponents, the methodology is described as 
consulting “the policies underlying the statute.”86  It seems to be assumed 
that this description will match the way that decisions are made about the 
applicability of statutes in the domestic context.  But quite the contrary—this 
description only highlights the differences. 
 
 84. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 49, at 300–01 (“This is a common problem of unforeseen 
or uncontemplated circumstances, and it is black letter law that such problems can be resolved 
by ascertaining the statute’s purpose and extrapolating from that purpose to the particular 
question . . . .  The objection thus really amounts to a claim that courts are unable to do 
something that they do all the time.”); Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 54, at 305 (“[W]e simply 
do not see how it follows that determining scope is not interpretation.  Statutes do not explicitly 
specify lots of things:  that is exactly why interpretation matters.  Courts or other 
decisionmakers often have to decide whether a law grants rights to, or imposes obligations on, 
a particular person in particular circumstances.  If a statute grants rights to pedestrians, does 
it do so to a person on rollerblades?  When this question is answered in the domestic context, 
we call it interpreting the law, and there is no reason to suppose it magically becomes 
something else simply because another state is involved.” (footnote omitted)). 
 85. Brilmayer & Seidell, supra note 60, at 2067. 
 86. Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 952 (“Stated differently, the Currie scholars assert that 
by investigating the substantive policies underlying a statute the court will be able to determine 
its intended territorial reach without resorting to the a priori rules that often led the territorialist 
system to unjust results.”). 
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Now, the task of compiling a complete list of evidentiary sources consulted 
in the context of domestic statutory construction is not a trivial task.  But for 
our purposes, we can look to William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s “funnel 
of abstraction” as an instructive foundation.87  The “funnel” is a hierarchical 
model identifying “the primary evidentiary inquiries in which [courts] will 
engage” when seeking to resolve a question of statutory interpretation—that 
is, the categories of evidence to which courts will look when seeking to 
determine the meaning of the statute.88  The funnel sets out the evidentiary 
sources, here listed in descending order of priority:  (1) the ordinary 
commonsense meaning of the text; (2) the whole act and purpose (meaning 
the purpose as inferred from the act when examined in a holistic manner); (3) 
judicial precedent; (4) legislative materials; (5) agency practice (which we 
might generalize to mean the practice of the body empowered to enforce the 
law, where applicable); and (6) norms and values.89 
There is room for disagreement about what exactly should be included on 
this list, as well as the proper hierarchy; but such disagreements would not 
affect the argument here.  What matters for present purposes is that only the 
second of these categories is considered in the context of governmental 
interest analysis, “whole act & purpose” or, as it is referred to in the interests 
analysis literature, the underlying policy.  The other five are either not 
mentioned or are dismissed as not authoritative.  We can start at the top. 
One would certainly think that the ordinary meaning of the text of the 
statute ought to be authoritative when it comes to statutory interpretation.  Of 
course, there may be differences of opinion as to whether it should exclude 
all other considerations.  Strict textualists would insist on limiting 
interpretation to only the text, while others might be more flexible.90  But no 
serious theory of statutory interpretation would declare the text irrelevant. 
Yet, astonishingly, many interest analysts do essentially that.  Proponents 
of interest analysis regularly assert state interests without offering 
justifications based on textual analysis and that often could not be so justified.  
Indeed, in Currie’s foundational work on interest analysis, which focuses on 
married women’s property statutes, his only engagement with the text of the 
statutes in question is to say “that the lawgivers do not mean all that they 
say.”91  Instead, he “stipulate[s]” to a set of interests based on the assumption 
that each state is concerned exclusively with assisting its local citizens.92  It 
is, of course, quite plausible that each state legislature acts to the benefit of 
its citizenry—but it is far from obvious that this end is never joined with 
 
 87. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990). 
 88. Id. 
 89. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW:  A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ 
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 30 (2016). 
 90. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70, 91–95 (2006). 
 91. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts:  A Study in Conflicts-of-Law Methods, 
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 231 (1958). 
 92. Id. at 231–32. 
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others that might be in tension with it, such as a desire to recognize the equal 
dignity of all persons regardless of their origin.93 
Consider, for example, a recent decision of a California appellate court 
where it held that California had no more than a “hypothetical” interest in 
applying its pro-plaintiff strict products liability law to a case in which a bus 
of Chinese tourists crashed in Arizona, killing some of the passengers and 
injuring others.94  Although one of the original defendants in the suit was a 
California-based tour bus operator that owned the bus, the court ultimately 
held that Indiana’s “more business-friendly” rule should be applied, given 
that none of the injured passengers were from California.95  Taking seriously 
the claims of the modernists, this analysis suggests that the court is imputing 
to the California legislature an utter indifference as to how its own residents 
treat foreign nationals outside of state lines, allowing business interests to 
trump basic safety so long as no Californians are harmed.  Perhaps this is 
correct, but such a distasteful conclusion seems hard to swallow when the 
court has offered no support in text or even precedent. 
In fact, the only California policy cited by the court—incentivizing 
manufacturers to put only safe products on the market—would seem to point 
against the decision ultimately reached, further enforcing the invented nature 
of the interests modernists posit.96  Moreover, it may even be the case that 
the interests of the local citizenry are best advanced through laws that level 
the playing field, thus encouraging individuals from other jurisdictions to 
enter the state and engage in commerce there.  Thus, one can see the 
implausibility of the foundational modernist notion that a pro-plaintiff law 
only gives rise to a state interest when the plaintiff is from that state; while a 
pro-defendant law only gives rise to a state interest when there is an in-state 
defendant.97  In other words, it is not clear that the modernists are even taking 
seriously the second category of evidence—whole act and purpose—and are 
instead substituting broad assumptions.98 
 
 93. Additionally, such an interest in always favoring the in-state litigant may be in tension 
with the interest in adhering to the U.S. Constitution. See Douglas Laycock, Equality and the 
Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 431, 446–47 (1987) (suggesting that Currie’s 
in-state preference rule violates equal protection). 
 94. Chen v. L.A. Truck Ctrs., LLC (Chen III), 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 562 (Ct. App. 2019), 
review denied, No. B265304 (Cal. Feb. 26, 2020). 
 95. Id. at 565. 
 96. See id. at 566 (“The policy behind imposing strict products liability ‘is to insure that 
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves.’” (quoting Barrett v. Superior Ct., 272 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1990))). 
 97. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and 
the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493, 495 (1985) (stating 
that it would be irrational for a state to apply the law of an unintentional tort to an accident 
that occurred within its state that involved no in-state citizens, because doing so “never will 
advance the purpose of its rule”). 
 98. Regarding the fourth category, legislative material, it is apparent that such material is 
taken more seriously in the domestic context than in the choice-of-law context.  It is close to 
impossible to find modernists mentioning legislative history as a source for statutory 
interpretation.  Admittedly, we should not place too much emphasis on this criterion for the 
simple reason that legislative materials are frequently unavailable in the state context, 
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Jumping to the end of the list, another important resource in statutory 
interpretation is normative canons—that is, norms and values.  Normative 
canons are presumptions drawn from broader policy considerations, 
normative backgrounds, and often, constitutional values.99  Far from being a 
secondary aspect of statutory interpretation, normative canons are routinely 
cited by courts.100  While much of the research in the area has focused on the 
federal courts, the same observation regarding the importance of substantive 
canons can be made in the context of state courts.101  Some commentators 
have likened the normative canons, particularly when weighed against the 
other sets of canons, as forming a “common law of statutory interpretation,” 
akin to the common law of contract, which has its own rules of 
interpretation.102 
One way of understanding the normative canons is that they provide the 
means by which judges can coordinate a statute with another body of law—
avoiding conflicts that would arise were the statute interpreted in isolation.  
Consider, for example, the constitutional avoidance canon, which—in its 
modern form—counsels that “a statute should be interpreted in a way that 
avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.”103  As reflected in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s use of the canon in National Federation of Independent Businesses 
v. Sebelius,104 the constitutional avoidance canon may sometimes involve 
contorting a statute’s meaning into shapes that might seem foreign to its text 
or stated purpose in order to avoid the law’s constitutional invalidation.  In 
that sense, many of the normative canons serve as canons of coordination or, 
what we might call, “conflicts avoidance” canons.  Another canon with a long 
historical pedigree helps establish this point further:  “statutes in derogation 
 
particularly older state statutory materials.  Perhaps that is why it is not mentioned in modern 
choice-of-law theory.  More likely, however, legislative history is ignored for the same reason 
as is text:  the modernists construct state interests from basic assumptions that are drawn from 
whole cloth—not ones that are actually derived from statements made by the legislature, 
whether in legislative history or in the statute itself.  Thus, as this differing treatment of 
legislative history helps to accentuate, the interpretive process employed by the modernist is 
of little resemblance to the usual processes of statutory interpretation to which they appeal.  
We have similarly seen no cases addressing how the relevant regulatory agency enforces the 
law, the fifth category, likely for similar reasons. 
 99. ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 89, at 11–13. 
 100. One study of the Supreme Court found that substantive canons were cited in 14.4 
percent of opinions authored between 2005 and 2011, while purpose was cited in 26.0 percent. 
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 850 
(2017). 
 101. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1806 
(2010). 
 102. Daniel B. Listwa, Comment, Uncovering the Codifier’s Canon:  How Codification 
Informs Interpretation, 127 YALE L.J. 464, 471 (2017) (quoting ESKRIDGE JR, supra note 89, 
at 21).  The notion of statutory interpretation as being integrated with common-law-making is 
one to which we turn below. 
 103. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 247 (2012). 
 104. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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of the common law shall be narrowly construed.”105  Like the constitutional 
avoidance canon, the derogation-of-common-law canon allows judges to 
interpret statutes in a dynamic fashion so as to reconcile conflicts with the 
common law.  The canon, which has its roots in the “traditional hostility of 
English judges to legislation,”106 essentially allows judges to retain 
significant “law-making power for themselves,” even in areas of the law 
thoroughly canvassed by statutory authority.107  These and other canons 
speak to the way in which judges do not interpret statutes in isolation but 
rather in a manner that places the particular statutes in conversation with 
other sets of norms.108 
As the notion of normative canons providing the basis for a “common law 
of statutory interpretation” suggests, their presence in the interpretation 
context reflects the great deal of creative discretion exercised by judges when 
engaged in resolving the open texture of the law.  More pointedly, they reflect 
the fact that judges regularly look beyond the substantive policies of the 
particular statute in question to consider other values that ought to be 
considered.  For example, when a court invokes constitutional avoidance in 
order to prevent a statute from violating a constitutional precept, it is looking 
outside of the specific statute in order to forward another set of values.  This 
is essentially the invocation of system values—here the constitutional 
system—in the context of constructing an individual statute.  This closely 
parallels the invocation of choice-of-law system values when a judge 
construes the interstate scope of a law such that its application is consistent 
with some broadly held choice-of-law rules—a way of integrating modernist 
and more traditionalist goals that we discuss further in the final part of this 
Essay.  There is, thus, straightforward continuity between the actual usual 
processes of statutory interpretation, which involve normative canons, and 
the invocation of system values in choice of law.  This is despite the fact that 
interest analysis asserts—without support—that carrying over the 
interpretive methodologies used in the purely domestic sphere to the choice-
of-law context would eschew the judicial invocation of such broader 
concerns.  In other words, a sophisticated model of statutory interpretation 
makes space for the integration of norms and presumptions intended to 
forward values such as predictability and uniformity, belying the modernists’ 
assertion that an approach to resolving choice-of-law problems that seeks to 
follow the “ordinary” process of legal interpretation must focus single-
mindedly on the law’s substantive polices, rather than a given state’s interest 
in producing a workable interstate system of conflicts resolution. 
 
 105. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2012); United States v. Texas, 507 
U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
 106. Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 107. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:  Erie for the 
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 769 (2013). 
 108. See, e.g., Daniel B. Listwa & Charles Seidell, Note, Penalties in Equity:  
Disgorgement After Kokesh v. SEC, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 667, 687–89 (2018) (discussing 
the courts’ use of presumptions based on background norms derived from equity). 
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A final point underscores the extent of the difference between modern 
choice-of-law theory and the actual usual methods of statutory construction 
and interpretation.  The ordering of these different kinds of statutory 
construction materials is important—but more important for our purposes is 
that there is an order.  The ordinary commonsense meaning of the text is 
listed first for a reason.  Text is considered the most authoritative, such that 
if an answer is found in the text—either explicitly or by very clear 
inference—it makes recourse to any of the other considerations unnecessary 
or at least less important.  The priority ordering of the remaining factors is 
not always straightforward—the force of a constitutional norm may be 
enough to bend the ordinary meaning of the text in some circumstances, for 
example.  But still, the general ranking is roughly lexicographic, meaning 
that consistency with a higher ranked evidentiary source will not be sacrificed 
to achieve consistency with a lower ranked source. 
The reasoning underlying this order is that the higher categories are more 
significant than the lower categories, but it is understood that evidence of 
meaning in the higher ranked categories may not be conclusive.  The reason 
that we have five categories following the first one—namely, ordinary 
meaning, is precisely because the ordinary meaning of the text may not 
supply an answer.  And the reason that we have additional categories after 
the whole act and purpose is that text together with the whole act still may 
not supply an answer.  In this manner, the very structure of the standard 
methodology of domestic statutory interpretation reveals awareness and 
acceptance of the fact that there may not always be an answer if one limits 
oneself to legislative text and purpose.  Additional categories are included 
precisely because it is understood that they will sometimes be needed.  
Therefore, there is no basis for the claim that the impoverished methodology 
employed by governmental interest analysis has any similarity at all to 
domestic interpretation. 
B.  Common Law in the Statutory System 
As the previous section describes, while the presence of a relevant statute 
certainly constrains and shapes the judge’s discretion in deciding on 
questions of multistate scope, the statute itself does not exhaust the 
evidentiary sources to which the judge will look when confronted with an 
interpretive question.  In particular, the judge may look at background 
norms—including presumptions derived from more systemic concerns.  But 
when it comes to understanding the role of judicial lawmaking in a statutory 
system, this is only part of the story.  There are many cases in which a 
particular statute has come to be understood as an invitation to a court to take 
jurisdiction over an issue and develop common law on the subject.  This 
provides another model for understanding how a sophisticated view of the 
judge’s role in statutory gap filling makes space for the sort of common-law 
decision-making that the modernists reject. 
Even a cursory examination of modern American legal practice establishes 
that, while sometimes controversial, judicial exercise of the substantive 
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power to elaborate on minimal statutory content is tolerated even when that 
elaboration is far more extensive than ever contemplated in the choice-of-
law context.  Take, for example, Delaware’s broad general corporation 
statute, which its courts have routinely characterized as an “enabling statute,” 
not intended to provide detailed guidance but rather to empower the courts 
to respond creatively to new problems.109  If it is illegitimate for courts to 
flex their policy muscles in the determination of multistate scope, then 
several important areas of American legal practice would have to be 
substantially reconfigured. 
The legal landscape of the modern era differs markedly from that which 
characterized the nineteenth century.  In the early years of the American 
republic, most state legislatures passed few statutes of general application.  
Instead, they largely enacted private bills, granting a debtor more time to pay 
creditors or permitting a town to build a road.110  More broadly applicable 
acts, such as one setting the procedures under which a person could obtain a 
divorce, were enacted, but those were the exceptions.111  The paucity of 
legislation left the judge with a prominent role, making the Blackstonian 
method of common-law-making, which was wholly within the purview of 
the courts, the dominant method by which the law developed. 
In contrast, in the modern era, legislatures have largely displaced the courts 
as the primary source of laws.  Today, when a litigant asserts a cause of 
action—whether it be in tort, contract, or something else—there is a good 
chance it is one that is grounded in statutory law.  But it is a mistake to 
conclude that the proliferation of statutes has rendered common-law-making 
irrelevant.  In fact, the process of common-law rulemaking frequently finds 
a place in the context of statutory construction. 
The most obvious place in which the common law remains nestled within 
the confines of statutory law is in the context of “common-law statutes.”  A 
common-law statute, as the term is used, refers to a statute that embodies a 
“broad delegation to the judiciary,” one in which “the legislature expects 
judges to develop the law over time by utilizing a free-form common law 
method.”112  The typical example—acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme 
Court as a common-law statute—is the Sherman Act,113 the foundational 
federal antitrust statute.114  Section 1 of the Act merely prohibits “restraint[s] 
of trade or commerce among the several States,” a broad standard that 
provides little guidance for how it ought to be applied.115  Rather than 
attempting to parse the original, specific intentions of the Congress that 
 
 109. See Leo E. Strine Jr., The Delaware Way:  How We Do Corporate Law and Some of 
the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 675 (2005). 
 110. Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft:  Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative 
Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712, 720 (2018). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 
120 YALE L.J.F. 47, 53 (2010). 
 113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
 114. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899–900 (2007) 
(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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enacted the law, the Supreme Court has viewed the Sherman Act as an 
invitation to the federal courts to “act more as common-law courts” and 
continue the process of developing the common law of antitrust that had first 
developed in England, “adapt[ing] to modern understanding and greater 
experience” as appropriate.116  In the case of common-law statutes, the 
legislative intervention serves as little more than an endorsement of the 
judicial project, leaving the Blackstonian process of common-law 
rulemaking largely undisturbed. 
Although the Sherman Act represents an extreme, both scholars and judges 
have noted a large swath of statutes that maintain for the courts a common-
law-making role.  For example, the Supreme Court has noted that in the 
context of private securities fraud actions under Rule 10b-5, a “judicial oak 
[] has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”117  Similarly, 
intellectual property scholars have pointed to many of the major enactments, 
such as the Copyright Act of 1976118 and the Patent Act,119 as serving as 
broad delegations to the courts, which have subsequently developed robust 
sets of legal rules with only the most cursory connections to the statutory 
text.120  More controversially, scholars have described the Administrative 
Procedure Act121 as codifying past common-law doctrine while still leaving 
room for the courts to continue evolving the law.122  With all of these statutes, 
the general view is that the legislative text serves largely to “enable” further 
lawmaking by the courts—even when the text of the statute includes no 
explicit enabling language.123  This does not mean that the statute itself 
provides no guidance but rather that the courts have a great deal of freedom 
to import external concerns—including those derived from social, economic, 
and political theories—in order to formulate a workable set of rules.  For 
example, in the context of the Sherman Act, over the last few decades the 
Court has crafted a robust set of doctrines built around an economic school 
 
 116. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 
98 n.42 (1981)). 
 117. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 118. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 119.  35 U.S.C. §§ 1–293. 
 120. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1126, 1167 (2009); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark:  Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 187, 198–99 (2004); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of 
Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010). 
 121. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 122. See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293, 1321 (2012); see also John C. Brinkerhoff Jr., FOIA’s Common Law, 36 YALE J. 
ON REGUL. 575 (2019) (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act can be fruitfully thought 
of as a common-law statute). 
 123. In this manner, these broad statutes can be contrasted with such laws as the Rules 
Enabling Act, which explicitly delegates to the U.S, Supreme Court the authority “to prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence.” 28 U.S.C §  2072(a). 
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of thought that did not even arise until some sixty years after the statute itself 
was enacted.124 
Generally, discussions of “common-law statutes” focus on federal law, but 
the most natural examples are actually on the state level.  Various state 
legislatures have passed statutes codifying features of specific areas of 
common law, such as torts and contracts, with the expectation that courts will 
be able to continue developing the doctrine.125  For example, the Supreme 
Court of California has explained that when the legislature enacted the 
California Civil Code it intended to codify the common law, while leaving to 
courts the freedom to develop the law by interpreting the code in a “flexible 
and adaptable” manner in “response to changing circumstances and 
conditions.”126  The court specifically referenced areas in which the code left 
gaps or used vague language as “provid[ing] ample room for judicial 
development of important new systems of rules.”127  Similarly, as already 
noted above, Delaware courts understand the general corporations law of the 
state as largely an invitation for judicial lawmaking.128  By understanding the 
legislation as implicit delegations to the courts, the state courts have retained 
much of their common-law-making authority, rendering the Blackstonian 
method of continuing importance even in today’s statutory era. 
The notion that statutory interpretation is inconsistent with a broad and 
substantial role for courts’ common-law-making authority is thus wholly 
without support.  Where the legislature has left the law in an open-textured 
manner, it falls on the courts to fill in the gaps creatively, often looking 
outside the individual policies of the statutes in question and toward broader 
values.  This is a lesson with particular application in the choice-of-law 
context.  Because legislatures have given courts little substantive guidance 
with regard to how the law should be applied in the interstate context, courts 
must utilize their discretion to fill in the gaps.  In doing so, they can 
appropriately look beyond the individual statutes, toward broader values—
including interstate harmony.  Neither interest analysis nor any of the modern 
choice-of-law theories provide any space for such a role.  Only by 
recognizing the important role of the common law of choice of law can one 
have a sufficiently robust theory for resolving conflicts.  In the next part, we 
illustrate what such a theory would look like, focusing in particular on how 
such a theory would impact the forthcoming Restatement (Third). 
III.  JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND THE FUTURE OF CHOICE OF LAW 
The Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws is bound to play an important 
role in the development of choice-of-law theory in the future.  Considerable 
thought has gone into making it not only theoretically sound but user-
 
 124. See Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2013, 2018–20 (2017). 
 125. See Leib & Serota, supra note 112, at 52–53. 
 126. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1238 (Cal. 1975). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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friendly, with “users” including judges, litigants, and lawyers.  As we have 
previously argued, the Restatement (Third)’s approach incorporates certain 
incompatible elements:  on the one hand, it offers a set of simple rules to 
resolve choice-of-law disputes, thus introducing predictability and 
uniformity; on the other hand, it directs courts to resolve disputes through 
bespoke acts of statutory interpretation, seemingly rendering the rules 
provided by the Restatement (Third) itself without force or relevance.129  But 
in this part, we revisit these issues—offering a way to resolve this 
incompatibility by looking below the surface of the Restatement (Third) and 
keeping in mind its drafters’ ambitions.  We believe that the key to this 
reinterpretation is the common law of choice of law.  In the sections that 
follow, we offer a vision of the role we believe the Restatement (Third) of 
Conflict of Laws should have in the future—elaborating on what precisely a 
common-law model of choice of law would look like in the process. 
A.  The Paradox of the Restatement (Third) 
As we have previously articulated, the current draft of the Restatement 
(Third) suffers from a deep contradiction.130  The drafters have two 
ambitions.  On the one hand, they seek to make conflicts feel less archaic and 
more understandable by providing within the Restatement itself a robust 
theoretical explanation of what choice of law entails.131  On the other hand, 
they have endeavored to provide a definitive set of leading rules, dictating 
how particular choice-of-law disputes ought to be decided.132  Stated at this 
high level of abstraction, there is no contradiction.  The problem, however, 
arises because of the specific theory that has been endorsed by the 
Restatement (Third). 
The drafters have embraced a novel theoretical framework—the “two-
step” theory—that integrates the basic tenets of interest analysis with some 
updated terminology.133  The “two-step” theory is described in the draft 
Restatement as follows: 
Resolving a choice-of-law question requires two analytically distinct steps.  
First, it must be decided which states’ laws might be used as a rule of 
decision.  This is typically a matter of discerning the scope of the relevant 
state internal laws:  deciding to which people, in which places, under which 
 
 129. See generally Brilmayer & Listwa, supra note 44. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The reporters’ memorandum prefacing the draft Restatement (Third) explains that one 
of the goals of the drafters was to render choice of law “intelligible to nonspecialists and to 
align with the ordinary process of legal analysis.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF L. 
add. to reporters’ memorandum at xv (AM. L. INST., Council Draft No. 2, 2017). 
 132. Id. (stating that the drafters “do not expect courts, except in rare cases where no 
Restatement rule provides guidance, to perform a two-step analysis themselves,” instead of 
relying on the set of rules provided by the Restatement). 
 133. Id. reporters’ memorandum at xv–xvi. 
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circumstances, they extend rights or obligations.  Second, if state internal 
laws conflict, it must be decided which law shall be given priority.134 
In other words, the two steps consist “first of determining the ‘scope’ of 
the contending statutes through the ordinary processes of statutory 
construction used for deciding purely domestic cases; and second, of 
reconciling overlapping state scope claims through the application of 
‘priority’ principles.”135  It is a decision-making process that sharply 
separates the unilateral examination of each state’s respective statute’s scope 
(at step one) with the multilateral, systems-oriented determination of priority 
(at step two). 
The virtue of the two-step theory is that it “domesticates” choice of law by 
setting aside strange terms like the state’s interests and more fully embracing 
the notion that choice-of-law problems can be answered by simply 
interpreting each statute that is implicated by a choice-of-law dispute.136  
Choice-of-law questions, in other words, should be answered like any other 
statutory issue, by engaging in a particularized interpretation of the 
implicated statutes. 
The problem, however, is that such a conception of choice of law leaves 
little relevance for the rules set out in the draft Restatement.  By surveying a 
large number of cases, the drafters have synthesized a body of black-letter 
rules that reflect the ways in which courts have resolved particular types of 
choice-of-law disputes in the past.137  The idea is that a court can look to the 
restatement in order to see how courts in other states have resolved similar 
disputes and then invoke the persuasive value of those other states’ decisions 
to come to a resolution of its own.  This is a familiar role for a restatement in 
most common-law subjects, but it does not quite fit with the conception of 
choice of law set out by the two-step theory.  Under the two-step approach, 
and modern choice-of-law theory more generally, one ought to be able to 
resolve a dispute wholly by looking to the substantive law in question.  To 
look beyond the state-specific law and to consider what other states have 
done would be a judicial imposition in violation of the principle of legislative 
supremacy.  This is a serious problem for the Restatement (Third) in its 
current form and one that needs to be addressed. 
We believe that the means of resolving this dispute are simple:  an embrace 
of the role of common-law-making in the choice-of-law context.  The 
Restatement (Third), following the modernists, assumes that the scope of the 
law in question can be determined conclusively by looking at the law and its 
underlying policy in isolation.  One only considers other policies—including 
 
 134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 5.01 cmt. b at 115 (AM. L. INST., 
Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016). 
 135. Brilmayer & Listwa, supra note 44, at 270. 
 136. Id. at 291. 
 137. Id. at 268; see also Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 54, at 298 (“The methodology of 
[the Restatement (Third)’s] Reporters is to look at current choice-of-law decisions under the 
Restatement (Second), other modern approaches, foreign-country systems, and even the 
practice of territorial states, and identify categories of cases where the results are consistent 
enough to be stated in the form of rules.”). 
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system values—in the second step, when determining which of the two 
overlapping laws should be given priority.  But as discussed in Part II, 
interpretation of the relevant law in isolation is neither likely to yield a 
conclusive answer (as it is rarely the case that the underlying policy will 
suggest a clear interstate scope) nor consistent with the pluralistic approach 
to interpretation that describes judicial decision-making in the domestic 
sphere (as indicated by the funnel of abstraction and the multiple categories 
of evidentiary sources it lists).  The two-step model is thus in tension with 
the realities of the typical choice-of-law dispute. 
These tensions, however, can be resolved by softening the boundaries 
between step one and step two (or, better yet, collapsing them entirely).  That 
is, by recognizing that when interpreting whether a statute or other law 
extends its scope to a particular interjurisdictional dispute, it is not 
inappropriate for a court to weigh considerations beyond the underlying 
policy, including system values, much as courts in the domestic context will 
consider not just the policy of the law in question but also constitutional 
values.  This is what it means to adopt a common-law approach to choice of 
law, as it integrates the judge’s creative decisional authority into the 
interpretive process.  More specifically, it suggests that the choice-of-law 
rules provided by the Restatement (Third) ought to be construed as 
presumptions that are integrated into the judge’s interpretative process, much 
as normative canons are integral to purely domestic statutory 
interpretation.138 
This is our vision of the future of choice of law:  an approach to resolving 
choice-of-law disputes that begins by looking at any applicable statutes, their 
texts and their purposes, but does not end there.  Rather, after noting the 
extent to which gaps exist in the relevant laws, courts should look to the 
Restatement’s rules as background presumptions that should be deferred to 
as a means of promoting uniformity and predictability.  Such an approach, 
integrating presumptions into the interpretive process and thus achieving 
values that go beyond the substantive policy ends of the particular statutes in 
question, is—as we demonstrated in the previous part—a familiar aspect of 
standard interpretive models.  In this sense, we agree wholeheartedly with 
the modernists’ claims that choice-of-law disputes should be approached 
through the same “ordinary legal analysis”139 used in domestic disputes—
but it is with regard to what is “ordinary” that we disagree.  As we have 
explained, to us, “ordinary legal analysis” in the choice-of-law context must 
recognize the role for judicial common-law-making. 
In Part III.D, we further elaborate on what the common-law approach 
would look like in practice and how it would relate to the Restatement 
(Third).  But before we provide this account, it is helpful to take one step 
back and reflect on the distinguishing characteristics of the common-law 
method, namely the nature and degree of decisional discretion left to judges. 
 
 138. See Brilmayer & Listwa, supra note 44, at 290. 
 139. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 54, at 303. 
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B.  The Distinguishing Characteristics of the Common Law of Choice of 
Law 
The most important distinguishing characteristics of a common law of 
choice of law (CLCL), understood in its most general sense, are its openness 
to judicial lawmaking and the relative freedom that judges have to consider 
a variety of factors as relevant to the rule being declared.  These two 
characteristics are related to one another.  It is because judges have the 
prerogative of making law that they are free to take a variety of social, 
economic, moral, and other factors into account.  Judges are not bound by 
strict formulaic instructions; they have decisional discretion.  An additional 
important feature that makes CLCL distinctive is its compatibility with a 
wide variety of outcomes.  Telling a judge to apply a “common-law model” 
of choice of law does not tell her how to decide a case but rather, what her 
attitude toward the process of resolving choice-of-law problems ought to be 
and what sorts of considerations may legitimately be taken into account.  
It might be tempting to define the common-law method in terms of the 
traditional commitment to system values, with the alternative modernist 
theories characterized by commitment to furthering the underlying 
substantive policies.  But this is too simplistic a dichotomy.  The modernists 
thought that the Restatement (First) wrongly disregarded statutes; and they 
thought that it was mistaken in treating domiciliary-connecting factors as less 
influential than territorial ones.140  It then merged the two criticisms, so that 
it was the inattention to legislatures that irremediably led to territorialism.  
From their treatment of contingency as a necessity and their conflation of 
methodology and result, they came to the conclusion that giving statutes their 
due would result in diminishing the significance of territorial factors.  This 
was, quite simply, a major logical mistake.  Greater emphasis on what the 
legislature wants leads to the abandonment of territorial factors only if the 
legislature does not want to employ territorial factors.  A modern CLCL can 
be either metaphysical or pragmatic.  It can be territorially oriented or 
grounded on domiciliary concerns.  It can focus on system concerns or on 
purely substantive concerns.  It can do all of those things and still reflect the 
functioning of a common-law court. 
A final distinctive characteristic of CLCL is its attitude toward statutes.  It 
is considerably more deferential to statutes than the modernist interest-based 
theories are.  This claim may surprise some readers.  Modernist theories 
proclaim loudly their respect for the statutes they enforce.  Traditional 
theories rarely mention statutes.  But in fact, common-law judges should, and 
ordinarily do, recognize in their decided cases that statutes reign supreme.  
Conversely, as we have discussed,141 the modernists’ regard for statutes is 
only surface deep—often imposing on the statute prior determinations of the 
law’s policy. 
 
 140. See supra notes 40–43. 
 141. Supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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The most important characteristic, instead, is the different roles that a 
theory might assign to judges.  Modern theory allocates most of the 
decisional authority to the choice-of-law theory itself.  The content of the 
decision can be found in the premises that modernist authors brought to bear 
on multistate disputes.  Particularly in the earlier forms of modern choice-of-
law theory, there is little if anything left for judges to do, except apply the 
interest analysis dogma:  states are interested when applying their own law 
that would benefit a local party.  Our proposal refocuses attention on the 
judicial process and on recalibrating the distribution of decision-making 
power.  Adoption of a CLCL requires some level of deference to decision-
making in the time and place of application.  But where does this leave the 
Restatement (Third)?  Which side of the line is it on? 
This section has described the CLCL in its most general sense of giving 
deference to the judicial role in creating law to fill statutory gaps.  But it is in 
the manner in which that judicial role is used to facilitate system values that 
the CLCL approach really takes shape.  As stated in the previous section, we 
believe that courts should utilize their common-law authority to move their 
respective states toward the uniform set of rules embodied by the draft 
Restatement.  In the remainder of this part, we elaborate on how the 
Restatement (Third) can help actualize a CLCL approach in the United 
States. 
C.  The Role of Restatements in American Law 
Restatements themselves do not purport to be authoritative; they are not 
taken as binding descriptions of what the law actually is.  Of course, the 
conventional wisdom is that restatements are designed to restate what the law 
is, not what the law ought to be.  And this is indeed the goal—at least most 
of the time.142  But when we say that the restatements are designed to state 
what the law is, we do not mean in so many words that a restatement is the 
law of Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Alaska, and so on.  Although we say 
that a restatement reports what the law is, there is no “what the law is” for 
the United States as a whole.  Or at least, not literally; the project of writing 
a restatement must be understood correctly and in accordance with the 
unspoken assumptions of the restatement’s writers and readers. 
The restatements are synthetic constructs, and they are understood to be as 
much.  We no longer believe—if in fact we ever did—that there is some 
“brooding omnipresence in the sky”143 that a restatement can report on.  
Rather, we understand that each restatement is looking at precedents from 
 
 142. The American Law Institute (ALI) describes the role of a restatement as providing 
“clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect[ing] 
the law as it presently stands.” AM. L. INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE 6 (rev. ed. 2015), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/08/f2/08f2f7c7-29c7-
4de1-8c02-d66f5b05a6bb/ali-style-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DWH-KSW2].  However, 
the ALI also notes that in certain cases a restatement should instead strive to “determine the 
best rule,” which might involve diverging from the approach that represents the majority view. 
Id. 
 143. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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throughout the fifty states and seeking to draw out from them prevailing 
trends.  There is no “American law of contracts,” but the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts does provide a way of discussing the contractual 
principles that have emerged through the common-law process throughout 
the country; the rules set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflect 
a synthesis of the common-law rulemaking on contracts.  The draft 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws is no different in this sense.  By 
synthesizing different courts’ choice-of-law decisions into a coherent body 
of rules, the Restatement (Third) offers a cogent view of choice of law as a 
common-law endeavor, building out guiding principles from generalizations 
regarding particular cases. 
We do not claim that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) had the 
common-law model in mind when they wrote the text; so far as we know, the 
drafters may very well violently disagree with our characterization.144  We 
expect our claim that the Restatement (Third) can actually be treated as an 
application of the common-law method to be controversial.  But the 
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws makes more sense when common-
law insights are brought to bear.  We therefore conclude this Essay with a 
reinterpretation of the Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws—one that 
maximizes its jurisprudential power and increases the likelihood of academic 
support and judicial adoption. 
D.  The Restatement (Third) as a Focal Point 
Given the limitations associated with the Restatement (Third)’s embrace 
of interest analysis as its conceptual framework, a more promising route 
would be for the drafters to cast the new restatement as explicitly endorsing 
the CLCL framework.  As discussed above, the CLCL framework recognizes 
the pragmatic value of the individual states adopting choice-of-law rules that 
cohere to form a uniform and predictable whole.  In order to achieve such a 
goal, the state courts must recognize the value of their common-law-making 
authority in order to take advantage of gaps in the law as opportunities to 
engage in gap filling that forwards system values.  However, it is not enough 
that the courts merely seek to forward system values in the abstract sense.  
Interstate harmony requires consensus and coordination. 
In an ideal world, such coordination would be carried out through direct 
coordination between the states, culminating with something akin to an 
interstate covenant or at least an explicitly formulated set of model acts that 
would be enacted by each state.  However, unlike state legislatures, state 
courts do not have those options—rather they are limited to acting in a 
unilateral fashion through individual judicial decisions.  And as already 
discussed, the lack of political interest in choice of law means that courts are 
largely left to confront these problems alone.  But the unilateral nature of 
these decisions does not mean that cooperation is impossible.  To understand 
 
 144. And in fact, in certain respects, the draft Restatement is not entirely consistent with 
the model we have been describing.  Some aspects of the Restatement (Third) would need to 
be reconsidered before it could be characterized as falling securely into the category of CLCL. 
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why, consider first the now familiar one-shot prisoners’ dilemma145:  the 
equilibrium result is that each player makes the selfish choice of 
“defecting”—that is, ratting out the coconspirator.  This results in a worse 
outcome for both players than if each had chosen to protect the coconspirator 
by remaining silent.  Analogizing to choice of law, this parallels a situation 
in which each state takes an action to prefer its own myopic interests, when 
the end result is a level of uncertainty and dysfunction that is worse than if 
the states had cooperated and adopted a single choice-of-law solution. 
But the dysfunction of the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma is not the end of 
the story.  As game theorists have observed, when players are given the 
opportunity to play the prisoners’ dilemma in an iterated fashion, cooperation 
can emerge as the superior strategy, as compared to simply defecting on 
every turn.146  It is this iterated game that offers a closer analogy to state 
courts making choice-of-law decisions.  The states are not locked into one-
shot interactions with their sister states but rather repeated interactions in 
which they are able to observe each other’s decisions and react accordingly.  
This suggests that cooperation is possible.  But an additional complication 
arises when one attempts to map an iterated prisoners’ dilemma onto the 
situation of states confronting choice-of-law problems:  when it comes to 
uniform choice-of-law solutions, there are plausibly multiple solutions that 
balance states’ substantive interests with system values.  This gives rise to 
what game theorists refer to as a coordination game—a situation in which 
there are multiple equilibria but they can only be reached if the players make 
a coordinated choice.147 
But this seems merely to bring us back to where we began:  how are the 
states to reach a coordinated choice when they cannot communicate 
directly?148  One option is for a court to use dicta to signal to other courts 
 
 145. Simply put, the prisoners’ dilemma imagines two accomplices to a crime being 
separated and each interrogated by a prosecutor who makes the following offer: 
You can confess or remain silent.  If you confess and your friend is silent, you go 
home free and I will use your testimony to lock up your friend for a long time.  But 
if you don’t talk and your friend does, then it is you who will be locked away.  If 
you both confess, I’ll make sure you get an early parole.  And if you are both silent, 
well, I’ll have to settle for minor jail sentences.  
Faced with these conditions, each is better off confessing (“defecting”) than remaining silent, 
regardless of what the other does. See Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ 
[https://perma.cc/CR9M-FF6R]. 
 146. Identifying the “winning” strategy in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma depends, among 
other things, on how one constructs the conditions of the game.  But as various theorists have 
shown through models intended to model natural selection, strategies that incorporate 
cooperation are frequently superior to purely selfish strategies. See generally Robert Axelrod, 
The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306 (1981). 
 147. See Don Ross, Game Theory, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory [https://perma.cc/KRTQ-BHMK]. 
 148. Of course, it is not impossible for the courts to communicate directly.  There exists, 
for example, the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ), which was founded in 1949 to provide 
the highest judicial officers of each state the opportunity to discuss matters impacting the 
administration of justice.  Indeed, in the early 1990s, the Mass Torts Litigation Committee of 
the CCJ was formed to encourage cooperation through the formulation of uniform civil 
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potential compromises that could be reached.  The Supreme Court famously 
uses dicta to signal how the Justices want other authorities—such as 
Congress, federal agencies, or state courts—to behave, essentially engaging 
in a form of coordination.149  In a similar way, state courts can and sometimes 
do use dicta as a way of suggesting uniform solutions and prompting other 
states to move toward them.  Consider, for example, the indirect negotiations 
that occurred in connection to the enforcement of forum-selection provisions 
in corporate bylaws and charters.  After one federal court refused to enforce 
such a bylaw, citing concerns about the circumstances under which it was 
adopted,150 the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a similar provision in an 
opinion that strongly endorsed the value of forum-selection provisions while 
also recognizing as valid as-applied challenges similar to those raised in the 
federal court.151  The Delaware court thus drew attention to a potential 
equilibrium point—generally enforcing these provisions but allowing as-
applied challenges—that balanced the concerns of each forum.152 
In essence, the Delaware court was, through dicta, proposing an 
equilibrium point around which the other states could coordinate.  Because 
of the outsized role that Delaware has in the context of corporate law, this 
was a highly salient form of communication—other courts pay attention to 
what the Delaware courts say.  But in that sense, the case of corporate forum-
selection provisions represents an outlier.  It is rare for any one court to hold 
particular sway in connection to any issue, including choice of law.  As a 
result, signals transmitted through judicial opinions are likely to get lost in 
the ether, rather than to orient the rest of the fifty states around some 
coordination point. 
Because of the difficulties associated with intercourt communication, what 
is needed is a coordination that is salient without relying on subtle language 
buried in judicial opinions.  In game theory, there is a technical term for 
these:  “Schelling points” or, more colloquially, “focal points.”153  Imagine 
two people traveling in New York City are unexpectedly separated—they 
want to reunite but failed to settle in advance where they would do so under 
such a contingency.  This is a coordination problem in which there are 
innumerable equilibria; if left up to chance, their likelihood of reuniting 
would be unfathomably small—there are simply too many possible places to 
meet in the City.  But, as Thomas Schelling famously observed, in situations 
 
procedure rules, so as to help overcome the growing burden created by asbestos litigation at 
that time—but the effort had limited success. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism 
in State Civil Justice:  Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a 
Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1193–94 (2005).  In large part, 
this can be traced to the fact that while state judges may be able to communicate directly, they 
cannot enter into multistate pacts and are ultimately limited to acting in unilateral fashion. 
 149. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring) (stating that “the ‘elephantine mass of asbestos cases’ cries out for a legislative 
solution” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 821 (majority opinion))). 
 150. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 151. Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 957 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 152. See Listwa & Polivka, supra note 25, at 119 (discussing this dynamic). 
 153. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–55 (1963). 
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like these, people manage to reunite at a rate much higher than chance.  He 
illustrated this through a famous experiment.  He asked a group of students 
where they would go if presented with a situation like that of the two lost 
travelers; a surprising number agreed on a single strategy:  the information 
booth at Grand Central Terminal at noon.154 
As Schelling explained, Grand Central at noon was a focal point—that is, 
an equilibrium that is particularly salient for reasons external to the “game”—
whether they be cultural, social, psychological, etc.—and thus useful as a 
means of focusing the players around a single, coordinated equilibrium.  The 
conventional focal point is, in some sense, naturally occurring—its salience 
is prior to the coordination game at issue.  But in the real world, it is possible 
to create focal points by raising the salience of particular strategies. 
The Restatement (Third) can be described as such a manufactured focal 
point.  The Restatement provides a highly salient set of strategies around 
which the courts can coordinate.155  Indeed, it is perfectly suited for such a 
job.  Coordination is most likely to be successful if the marginal benefits of 
moving toward uniformity are outweighed by the marginal costs to each 
state’s substantive goals—that is, where the coordination centers around an 
equilibrium.  Such an end is facilitated when coordination is carried out in 
relation to a focal point that is itself consistent with each state’s substantive 
policy.  In other words, the ideal focal point is one that requires the least 
amount of change from what the states are already doing individually.  This 
is exactly what a restatement does.  The drafters of the Restatement (Third) 
have carefully surveyed each state’s precedents to determine what solution 
to a particular problem has prevailed among the states.  Assuming that courts 
have, by and large, adopted the approach that is consistent with their 
substantive policy, then the result of the Restatement drafters’ survey is the 
point that is maximally consistent with state policy from a nationwide, 
aggregated perspective.  This provides an ideal focal point around which the 
states can coordinate to achieve the benefit associated with interstate 
harmony. 
To utilize the Restatement (Third) as such a tool for coordination, the 
courts need not do anything unusual.  As has already been described, choice-
of-law problems regularly demand that courts engage in gap filling, 
construing statutes that contain no explicit or even implied directions as to 
how they are to be extended into the interstate context.  In such cases, the 
common-law-making authority of the court is plainly invoked.  In exercising 
this discretionary authority, the courts should look toward the Restatement 
(Third)’s rules as providing presumptive answers.  The court ought then to 
judge whether that presumption is consistent with the other sources of legal 
authority that are appropriately invoked; such a fluid interpretive process 
simply mirrors what courts regularly do in the purely domestic sphere.  In 
that sense, integrating the CLCL framework into the utilization of the 
 
 154. See id. at 54–55, 58. 
 155. Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 162 
(1991) (using game theory to describe the benefits of reciprocity in choice of law). 
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Restatement (Third) is not a wholesale rejection of the modern choice-of-law 
theory and its embrace of the ordinary processes of statutory interpretation 
but rather, a development of it—the generation of a more sophisticated model 
of what the principle of legislative supremacy truly demands in the interstate 
context. 
To conclude, consider once again Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers, 
LLC156 (Chen III), the case involving the tour bus accident.  As discussed 
above, in that case, a California appellate court held that California had no 
interest in applying its own products liability law to a case in which no 
California citizens were harmed and thus only Indiana, the state in which the 
bus was made, had an interest in applying its law.  But what was not 
mentioned in our previous discussion was that the opinion by the appellate 
court was actually issued on a remand from the Supreme Court of California 
on a procedural issue.157  In fact, in its initial opinion, the very same appellate 
court had come to the exact opposite conclusion—that is, it held that it was 
California that had an interest in applying its products liability law and that 
Indiana had no interest in the case at all.158  Placing the two opinions next to 
each other, it is as though one is looking at the other through a fun house 
mirror; while the first opinion discusses how California’s interests extend 
beyond “simple plaintiff compensation” and include policing its citizens’ 
actions beyond its borders,159 the second opinion describes California’s 
interests in the case as purely “hypothetical”;160 and while the first discusses 
how Indiana has no interest in protecting a foreign buyer of its products,161 
the second discusses Indiana’s interest in having its law applied to those who 
do business with its residents.162  The California Supreme Court’s remand 
was procedural in nature—it did not touch on the substantive question of 
which law should apply—and yet, on remand, the appellate court came out 
the opposite way. 
How are we supposed to reconcile these two very different opinions 
coming from the exact same court?  Can it really be that the appellate court 
simply erred initially in divining what substantive policies underlay each 
state’s laws, only to correct that error on remand?  No person who takes 
seriously the lessons of legal realism is likely to accept such an answer.  
Rather, the most logical reading of the situation is that the court was 
presented with a difficult question in which there was no ready answer within 
existing precedents or statutes; forced to make a choice, the court utilized its 
discretion and reached a decision, only to be prompted, albeit indirectly, to 
reconsider by the California Supreme Court.  But none of that reality can be 
 
 156. 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied, No. B265304 (Cal. Feb. 26, 
2020); see also supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Chen v. L.A. Truck Ctrs., LLC (Chen II), 444 P.3d 727, 728 (Cal. 2019). 
 158. Chen v. L.A. Truck Ctrs., LLC (Chen I), 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 156 (Ct. App. 2017), 
rev’d, 444 P.3d 727 (Cal. 2019), remanded to 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455 (Ct. App. 2019). 
 159. Id. at 155. 
 160. Chen III, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 562. 
 161. Chen I, 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 156. 
 162. Chen III, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 566. 
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seen in the opinions.  Required to accept the theoretical framework of 
government interest analysis, the court has no means by which to explain the 
role of judicial discretion and judgment in its decision. 
Now consider how adoption of the CLCL, along with reference to the 
Restatement (Third), would have changed the reasoning—if not the result.  
Within the CLCL framework, the court would discuss the open-textured 
nature of the substantive law at issue and the role for judicial lawmaking that 
results.  Further, it would discuss factors beyond the myopic interests of the 
states, including, most crucially, the goal of generating a uniform and 
predictably nationwide system.  Finally, the court would look to the guidance 
of the Restatement, explaining how doing so enables the court to utilize its 
discretion in a manner that forwards system values.  With such an approach, 
the court would not have been shoehorned into making outrageous remarks, 
such as that California has no interest in the safety of Chinese tourists; nor 
would it have been forced to expound inexplicably a view seemingly 
irreconcilable with what it had stated previously. 
As this example illustrates, government interest analysis—with its one-
note focus on the substantive policies of the states—is simply too crude a 
system to reflect the realities of judicial decision-making in the face of 
difficult choice-of-law problems.  An approach embracing the realities of 
common-law-making makes space for a broader vocabulary, placing system 
values alongside substantive policies, and thus allows judges to articulate 
their reasoning in a way that reflects reality.  Moreover, the CLCL 
framework, in building out this broader conceptual space, clarifies the role to 
be played by the Restatement (Third), justifying the important place in 
American choice of law that it deserves to hold. 
CONCLUSION 
For more than a generation, choice of law has been the victim of a 
historical contingency.  By calling attention to the way in which Beale’s 
vested rights theory relied on metaphysical principles, the legal realists 
undeniably did a service to the field of choice of law, opening up the archaic 
field to more pragmatically oriented approaches.  However, the attack on 
traditional choice of law was far from a targeted strike.  In the realists’ wake, 
the conflicts revolution and its thought leaders bundled together three 
concepts which, although all typifying the traditional approach, are not 
inherently connected:  the scientific formalism of Bealean territorialism, a 
system-values approach to choice of law, and judicial activism. 
The revolutionaries tied an anchor to Beale’s formalism, sinking the regard 
for system values and judge-led decision-making in the process.  In their 
stead, interest analysis, a supposedly pragmatic, policy-oriented, and 
legislatively centered approach, gained prominence.  But as this Essay has 
argued, the reorientation around the legislature has been nothing but a façade.  
Interest analysis and its modern variants all claim that the standard techniques 
of statutory interpretation ought to be determinative of how courts resolve 
choice-of-law problems.  Further, they assert that such an approach 
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invariably leads to a conflicts methodology that places each state’s interest 
in forwarding its individual substantive policy goals above any broader 
interest in facilitating interstate harmony.  But the fact is, in this context, 
“statutory interpretation” is merely an empty phrase.  With a few notable 
exceptions, legislatures never address choice-of-law issues when drafting 
statutes.  Thus, any time a conflict between two relevant states’ laws occurs, 
courts are certain to find themselves in the center of a statutory gap. 
Gaps are, of course, familiar territory for courts.  And indeed, the standard 
methods of statutory interpretation have generated numerous modalities by 
which gaps are overcome.  Since at least the time of Blackstone, judges have 
engaged creatively with hard cases to arrive at solutions that not only “fill” 
gaps in the statute but also harmonize statutory law with other values and 
principles held by the relevant jurisdiction, including those that are common 
law and constitutional in origin.  In recent years, those studying statutory 
interpretation have become increasingly sophisticated in their understanding 
of the ways in which courts use expansive sets of resources to counter 
difficult cases, leading to wide recognition of the “common law” of 
interpretation.  But, so far, choice-of-law theorists have been left behind—
continuing to adhere to a primitive conception of statutory interpretation that 
shuns the role of the judge and the importance of broader goals, including the 
facilitation of system values.  The Restatement (Third), in its current draft, 
continues that error, wholeheartedly endorsing an outdated and unworkable 
mode of interest analysis. 
In this Essay, we have offered a means of modernizing the modernists and 
rescuing the Restatement (Third) in the process.  The key insight, we have 
argued, is to recognize that judicial creativity and attention to the facilitation 
of a workable system of choice of law is fully consistent with realism.  
Moreover, the principle of legislative supremacy is better protected by a 
methodology that does not mask metaphysical invention behind empty 
phrases like “interests” but instead, recognizes explicitly the important yet 
limited role of the judiciary.  In line with these recommendations, we 
advocate for the embrace of a CLCL methodology, an approach that 
recognizes judicial, common-law rulemaking and that does not rely on sharp, 
fictive lines drawn between “interpreting” the law and developing system-
oriented rules. 
Embracing CLCL in the Restatement (Third) would overcome the 
theoretical paradox at the current draft’s center.  The Restatement seeks to 
bring uniformity and simplicity to choice of law by offering a number of 
easy-to-apply rules; yet at the same time, it provides a full-throated 
endorsement of the notion that each choice-of-law problem should be solved 
by a particularized exercise in statutory interpretation.  The common-law 
approach advocated here breaks through this apparent contradiction by 
recognizing that the rules offered in the Restatement are not derived from 
statutory interpretation.  Rather, they have emerged from common-law 
rulemaking as a solution to the problems created by the gaps in legislated 
law.  And, like other such common-law rules, courts can integrate them into 
their interpretive processes by using them as substantive presumptions.  
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Conceptualized in this manner, the Restatement (Third)’s rules can serve as 
uniform focal points around which courts throughout the United States can 
coordinate. 
CLCL weds the modern with the traditional.  Embracing the lessons of the 
revolutionaries and the modernists, it does away with pseudoscientific 
adherence to metaphysical principles.  But at the same time, it returns to the 
traditional roots of choice of law by giving top billing to system values and 
the judges that facilitate them—this time through the lens of game theory.  
Finally, it looks outside of the field of conflicts toward modern, sophisticated 
theories of statutory interpretation to explain how judicial creativity and 
broader, substantive values can sit coherently with the principle of legislative 
supremacy.  By bridging these different theories and placing them within a 
single conceptual framework, CLCL offers a means of rising beyond the 
disputes that have defined the last century of choice-of-law scholarship and 
paving the way for the future of the field. 
